Total Destruction
of Enemy Troops at Oguta
All enemy attempts to cross the Ebocha bridge in his bid
to invade Oguta proved abortive. The Biafran troops of 60 Brigade, stationed at
the bridge, beat the enemy back as often as he attacked, until there was a
stalemate. On the 9th of September, however, our troops there reported seeing
what appeared to be enemy boats moving up the Orashi River towards Oguta. When
this report was investigated with an Air Force helicopter the following day, it
was discovered that there were six enemy boats already at Ezi-Orsu, less than
four miles to Oguta town. The alarm was given, and the Biafran Navy went into
action with its lone boat mounted with a six-pounder. This boat had been lying
idle on the Oguta Lake for some time. In the subsequent battle the Biafran Navy
destroyed two enemy boats before I received a hard hit and had to limp back to
the Lake. By first light on the 11th of September, my mobile Headquarters moved
to join the Navy Headquarters at Oguta. The town of Oguta appeared absolutely
normal for the civilian population was not yet aware of the explosive
situation.
My first rude shock on arrival at Oguta came with my
discovery that the Navy had no troops at all stationed in Oguta except for a
few administrative elements and, with all army units of 60 Brigade now
by-passed by the enemy, there was no one to fight in defence of Oguta. When all
of a sudden Oguta town came under heavy bombardment, which was quickly followed
by massive air raids the few Naval ratings assembled by Captain Anuku found it
difficult to stay in their locations along the Lake. No trenches had been dug
because no one ever dreamt that Oguta could be threatened or was going to be
threatened at such a short notice. It was now too late to dig trenches because,
besides the heavy artillery and mortar bombardment going on, the Russian jets
strafed and bombed individuals who dared to move around.
The situation was so hopeless that I had to brave a trip
from Oguta to Owerri to try to get some troops from Nwajei’s 14 Division. Twice
on the way a jet fighter attacked my car unsuccessfully. At 14 Division I
wrenched from Ugokwe’s 52 Brigade a strong company of 250 armed men and the
Brigade’s only anti-tank weapon, regardless of Ugokwe’s protests for losing so
much. Unfortunately, by the time this reinforcement got to Oguta with me, the
enemy had entered and occupied the town. The troops of the 52 Brigade were then
used for establishing initial defences along Oguta-Mgbidi road. When the
Biafran Air Force and the Navy eventually found some men and deployed them
along Oguta-Uli road, the enemy was reasonably well contained inside Oguta town
itself.
With Uli Airport six miles away, the only Biafran link
with the outside world, the situation was so grave that unless it was rectified
at once, the war could come to an abrupt end within a short time. In
preparation for a counterattack, I ordered Amadi of the 11 Division to send up
an infantry battalion. By first light on the 12th Amadi had brought up 300
armed men himself, being the best, he could do immediately while the rest were
to follow when assembled. The Navy and the Air Force had about 100 armed men
each and the 250 men of 14 Division were still there. All added up to a
sizeable force for a counterattack. The Head of State made available more
ammunition than we ever dreamt of for operations of that nature. The outline
plan was to move in 14 Division troops assisted by the Navy on the
Mgbirichi-Oguta road to take the left half of the town including the Lake. 11
Division force, assisted by the Air Force, would move along Uli road to clear
right of the town. The H-hour was fixed at 1600 hours on the 12th of September
to give the field commanders sufficient time to do their reconnaissance and
issue detailed orders to their troops. I left the area of Oguta at 0700 hours
to go and deal with other urgent matters and also to prepare for the operation.
Achuzia, who was also delegated to assist with the
operation later came to see me at 1300 hours looking extremely worn out and
dejected. He revealed that the counterattack I planned on Oguta for 1600 hours
had already taken place and failed woefully. He narrated how Colonel Ojukwu
came to the sector at 0900 hours shortly after my departure, and ordered an
immediate counterattack to be controlled by him personally. Not only had the
operation failed and the Head of State return to Umuahia, all the ammunition
including 300 rounds of 105 mm artillery shells we had saved up for the
operation had been exhausted. Colonel Nwajei and Captain Anuku who, together
with Achuzia, had commanded the troops during this futile operation, were now
re-organising what was left of their troops. Achuzia still maintained that we
could clear Oguta.
At the end of his story, I ordered Achuzia to return to
Oguta and inform all commanders to prepare to repeat the operation at 1700
hours, and this time properly. Shortly after Achuzia left I received the
following signal message from Colonel Ojukwu:
"C-in-C for GOC. Oguta operations. Army efforts at Oguta
appear fruitless. There is no basis for Achuzia's optimism. Nwajei only hopes
while Anuku is hopeless. You will take the situation personally in hand and
report progress. Acknowledge".
The second attempt to clear Oguta on the 12th started
promptly at 1700 hours in accordance with the original plan. Achuzia, Anuku,
and Nwajei displayed such determination and gallantry during the battle that by
1845 hours, all our troops had converged on the banks of Oguta Lake, having
cleared the town completely. It was sad to watch enemy soldiers who had missed
their boats jump into the lake rather than stay on and be captured. Much
equipment and clothing were salvaged from the boats which we destroyed,
including a 40mm Bofor anti-aircraft gun marked "Royal Electrical and
Mechanical Engineers" (REME) and a Panhard armoured vehicle which was
immediately christened "Oguta Boy.” When I telephoned Ojukwu at Umuahia
later that night to give him the good news, he found it almost impossible to
believe me.
During the 24 hours the enemy was in occupation of Oguta
our defences around Ebocha bridge had disintegrated and our own troops had
withdrawn completely, thus enabling the enemy to link-up all the way from Oguta
to Port Harcourt. The clearing of the enemy from Oguta was therefore a small
fraction of the task of removing the overall enemy to Uli Airport and the
recovery of Egbema oil fields. The enemy was now at Ezi-Orsu only four miles
away and not only was Uli Airport still threatened from there, but we were yet
to recapture the Egbema oil fields which were the only remaining source of
crude oil for the entire Biafra. There was pressure on the Army from all
quarters to regain the oil fields, as the nation was already feeling the pinch
of their loss. What people did not realise was that we did not even have enough
ammunition with which to prevent the enemy from re-entering Oguta or making a
possible successful move to Uli Airport.
When enemy threat increased together with the local
pressure, Major Asoya, the commander of 60 Brigade came to see me to demand
ammunition with which to clear Ezi-Orsu and Egbema. I gave him whatever I had,
which was grossly insufficient, and told him to go to Defence Headquarters at
Umuahia and ask for more if he thought he had a chance of succeeding. When he
got to Umuahia, Ojukwu ordered him to return to his unit location without
delay.
The Head of State discovered, shortly after his order to
Asoya, that he was still in Umuahia and put him under close arrest for
disobedience. Ojukwu then summoned me to Umuahia and after briefing me on
Asoya's obstinacy, asked me to look for a new Brigade Commander for 60 Brigade.
But when Asoya, who was still around, explained that he was waiting for his
vehicle which he had sent somewhere in town to collect brigade stores, I
convinced Ojukwu to forgive him.
He subsequently got some ammunition for his operation.
Asoya had a company of 200 men for the operation but both the Air Force and the
Navy were kind enough to make available to him a Company of 150 armed men each.
I took down with me “Corporal Nwafor," and with my mobile Headquarters
just outside Ezi-Orsu, Asoya and I launched the men into battle.
The men of 60 Brigade, fighting with an armoured vehicle
for the first time, were by far too excited to think of danger. “Corporal
Nwafor" was simply wonderful and so were the soldiers. Soon Ezi-Orsu fell
and the push towards Egbema oil fields began. At the end of a five-hour
continuous battle, we had recaptured Egbema oil fields and pushed the enemy
down to Okwuzu. We could easily have continued to Ebocha, but we had to
preserve some ammunition for possible counterattacks. Casualties were evacuated
throughout the operation but it was worth it, for once again, oil was flowing
in Biafra. I really wonder now how many people in Biafra realised how close we
were to the end of the war when we lost Oguta and Egbema. For his bravery and
determination, Major Asoya, who a few days before was about to go into
detention, was promoted to the rank of a Lieutenant Colonel.
Excerpts from The Nigeria Revolution and the
Biafra War by Alexandra A. Madiebo
Published by:
Chibuike John Nebeokike
For: Biafra State Media
0 comments so far,add yours