BIAFRA
The case for
INDEPENDENCE
GEOFFREY
BIRCH
DOMINIC
ST. GEORGE
BRITAIN-BIAFRA
ASSOCIATION
46
Tytherton Road, London, N.19
Tel:
01 272 2931
©
February 1968
Reprinted
March 1968
Second
reprint June 1968
FOREWORD
My experience in several ex-British colonies has convinced me that
in far too many instances the British Government has abdicated its
responsibilities for minority races far too quickly, and has all too often, in
addition, tried, to create large unworkable Federations out of disparate and
incompatible units.
In Nigeria, as in Central Africa, East Africa, and the West
Indies, a Federation was imposed upon indigenous peoples who later rejected it.
There is a fundamental difference in Nigeria between the Hausas who are Moslem
and conservative, and the Ibos who are Christian and progressive. The
possibility of conflict was foreseen by many Colonial Service officials in
Nigeria. I myself, with some others, refused to be in any way associated with
the system of government bequeathed to Nigeria with independence, and preferred
to leave Nigeria under a severe financial handicap rather than bear any
responsibility for the terrible warfare that was bound to erupt between Hausa
and Ibo.
During the years I was in Nigeria I frequently came across a “whispering
campaign” against the Ibos. But there was more than whispering. In 1954 the
Sardauna of Sokoto was reported in the Daily Times as saying, “When the British
leave we shall sweep the Ibos into the sea".
The Hausas are now trying to do exactly that under Colonel
Mohammed and Colonel Shuwa, and with the utmost ferocity. Many of my Ibo
friends are now dead, and the peaceful land of Nigeria is ablaze with a war as
bloody as the American Civil War, to which it has some resemblance.
It is my considered opinion that the British Government should be
utterly neutral in this conflict between two Commonwealth races, but should end
its diplomatic inactivity and take the initiative to send a Commonwealth peace
mission to try to bring peace to this vast country.
I must conclude by saying that I think Mr. Birch and Mr. St.
George have rendered tremendous service to the cause of peace and fair play in
writing this booklet, and I believe the contents to be entirely true. I am full
of admiration for the Biafran nation in their brave stand against annihilation,
and hope that this booklet will stir the British public to understand the
tragedy, and the British Government its responsibilities.
Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Hornby,
R.D., R.N.R., B.Sc.(Econ.), A.C.C.S., A.M.B.I.M., A.I.B.
Formerly: The Treasury
Department,
Federation of Nigeria (1950-8).
THE IRONSI REGIME — JANUARY TO JULY 1966
On the 15th
January, 1966, a group of young Nigerian army officers attempted the overthrow
of the Nigerian Federal Government. Many of the details surrounding these
events have still to be revealed, but certain facts are clear.
The coup was
unsuccessful. Having achieved their aims in the North, the junior officers
concerned were foiled in Lagos by the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed
Forces, Maj. General Aguiyi-Ironsi to whom they eventually agreed to surrender
their arms and by whom they were detained awaiting trial. Maj. General Ironsi
was invited by the surviving members of the civilian regime to assume full
responsibility for the government of the Federation.
The young
officers were at the same time successful in having achieved the overthrow of
politicians who were generally accepted to have been corrupt and who had, for
some time, been incapable of maintaining law and order. Their achievement was
popular throughout the country. To quote Dr. Okoi Arikpo, at present Federal
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs:
“Well might the
men who planned and executed the coup be satisfied, for the Army take-over was
hailed by every section of the country, including the political parties in
power at the time of the coup.” (The
Development of Modern Nigeria, Penguin African Library.)
None of the
evidence available supports the contention, often advanced in recent months in
order to excuse the slaughter which was to follow, that the coup was a tribal,
Ibo movement aimed at the domination by Ibos of the central government. All the
indications are to the contrary. Dr. Arikpo (op. cit.) describes the revolt as “widespread,
well co-ordinated and effective”, and he quotes Major Nzeogwu, one of the
leaders of the revolt, as saying that the mutineers constituted “a national company”
and that “Most of those concerned with the revolt in the North were Northerners
”.
The Federal
Government publication Nigeria 1966 does not directly allege that the coup was
an “Eastern plot”. It does, however, imply this by describing the plotters as “a
small group of Army Officers mainly from the Ibo ethnic group of the Eastern Region”.
It furthermore suggests, even more indirectly, some sort of involvement in the
coup by Maj. Gen. Ironsi. Nevertheless, the coup is finally described as having
been “foiled by intervention of the bulk of the Nigerian Army”.
Another, more
detailed official account of the events of this time, January 15th: Before and
After. Government Printer, Enugu, provides evidence that leading Northerners
(including Major Hassan Usuman Katsina, now Chairman of the Council of Northern
States), were closely involved with the mutineers:
"During the
press conference of 19th January, at which Major Nzeogwu introduced Major
Katsina as the new Military Governor of the North, Major Nzeogwu said that he
would always remember that at the crucial moment Major Katsina was on his side.
To this Major Katsina replied: ‘I have been able to help Major Nzeogwu with
some of his problems during the past few days. I am his good friend and I am
sure that he will now help me. We will work together for the betterment of our
country.’ In the same manner Alhaji Ali Akilu, Head of the Northern Civil
Service, collaborated with Major Nzeogwu and ensured that the latter had the
necessary funds to pay local workers. At a press conference on 15th January,
Major Nzeogwu appointed a government of civil servants under Alhaji Ali Akilu,
who was designated ‘Officer Administering the Government of Northern Nigeria';
a government which was ‘to stamp out nepotism, tribalism and
regionalism'."
A further
accusation made against the Ironsi regime which has often been accepted as
adding weight to the charge that there had been some collaboration between the
plotters and Maj. Gen. Ironsi himself is that the individual mutineers who had
been placed in detention after the coup were never brought to trial. The
Eastern Government (January 15th: Before
and After) quotes West Africa, edition of 29th January, 1966, as saying
that the subject was “certainly on the agenda” of the very first meeting of the
Supreme Military Council. The Eastern Government goes on to say:
“A decision was
taken by the Supreme Military Council that Lt. Col. Gowon, Chief of Staff,
Army, should investigate the circumstances of the Revolution, ascertain the
extent of guilt of each participant and submit his findings to the Council as a
matter of extreme urgency. This fact Lt. Col. Gowon has never told the world.
In meeting after meeting of the Council Lt. Col. Gowon was asked about his
report and each time his reply was that he had no time and that he was still
collecting a lot of evidence. When at last in May he announced that he had
finished, members of the Council asked if they could have copies of the report.
His reply was that they would have them as soon as they were ready. Up till now
(March 1967) the Supreme Military Council has not received the report of Lt.
Col. Gowon on the events of 15th January.
A final comment
on the question of the intentions of the 15th January revolutionaries was made
by the Economist on 12th February,
1966, who pointed out that even if the revolution was an Eastern one
"(which is by no means proved) this is largely academic because the men
who carried it out are not now in power".
Who, indeed, were
the men in power in Nigeria at the time the Economist’s
Lagos correspondent made this observation? The suggestion has frequently been
made that the avowed intent of Gen. Ironsi’s regime to achieve a unitary form
of government simply masked an attempt by the Ibos to dominate Nigeria. It is
said that the massacre of Eastern officers and other ranks of Eastern origin in
the army which followed at the end of July was the inevitable and spontaneous
reaction of the North to this undercover attempt at Ibo domination of the whole
country.
At the time Gen.
Ironsi’s regime promulgated Decree No. 34 (May 1966), a decree which would have
resulted in greater centralisation, the composition of the Ironsi Government
Armed Forces was as follows:
Supreme Military Council North 2
members
West
& Lagos 3 members
Mid-West 1
member
East 2
members
Federal Executive Council North
3 members
West
& Lagos 3 members
Mid-West 1
member
East 3
members
Heads of Federal Civil Service North 8
West
& Lagos 5
Mid-West 7
East 3
Heads of Federal Corporations
and Institutions North 6
West
& Lagos 12
Mid-West 1
Expatriate 3
East 3
Disposition of Army Command
Mid-West
Supreme
Commander Brigadiers East
West 2
North 1
Battalions
East 3
North 2
West 1
Mid-West
1
Headquarters
East 2
North 2
Mid-West
1
Special Branches
West 3
North 2
East 1
(Source: January 15th, Before and After, Government Printer,
Enugu.)
Plainly, the
suggestion that the violence which broke out in Northern Nigeria in May was a
spontaneous reaction to an attempt at Ibo domination through the Ironsi regime
rings false. David Loshak, writing in the Daily
Telegraph on 17th June, gave this explanation of the origins of the riots
which resulted in some 3,000 Easterners being killed:
“The riots and
disorder developed inevitably from demonstrations which were well planned and
occurred simultaneously over a huge area. Only the dispossessed and now
outlawed politicians have the necessary organisational machinery for this, so
when Hausa slaughters Ibo, it is also a sign that the politicians are fighting
back. There are powerful interests, too, manipulating the politicians. It is
easy to see that some large international commercial concerns which had key
personalities in their pockets would like to see them back in power."
The official account
of the Gowon regime goes a long way to support this view. Nigeria 1966 states:
“Meanwhile, in
the North the local petty contractors and party functionaries whose livelihood
depended solely on political party patronage became active. Most of them, like
their counterparts in other Regions, were indebted to either the Northern
Marketing Board or the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation. They were the
hardest hit by the change of government especially as all those indebted to
Marketing Board and the N.N.D.C were made to pay up their arrears. They
resorted to whispering ‘campaign’, rumour mongering and incitement, aided and
abetted by other factors. They are the elements most close to the ordinary
people and they have utilized that to create a public opinion which is very
strong and potentially dangerous against the authorities.”
The May riots and
the reception given to Decree No. 34 were a blow to all supporters of the “One
Nigeria” concept. Support for this concept was widespread amongst the Nigerian
elite, not least amongst the Ibo-speaking portion of this elite.
At this moment,
with 3,000 of his people lynched by Northern mobs and the rest of the two
million strong Eastern community in Northern Nigeria poised to return home to
the safety of the Eastern Provinces, Col. Ojukwu, Military Governor of the
East, broadcast an appeal for calm on the morning of 30th May. “I wish to
assure all of you that the National Military Government is taking all necessary
steps to bring the situation back to normal. The steps taken so far have had a
salutary effect. Those Nigerians who are fomenting these disturbances will face
the consequences of their actions, and their foreign backers will be dealt with
in an appropriate manner.” The exodus of Easterners from the North was
prevented.
It is clear that
Col. Ojukwu realised, in common with his fellow members of the Supreme Military
Council, that if the Eastern community resident in the North had returned to
the East all hope of forging unity in Nigeria would be lost. Some weeks later
Col Ojukwu expressed more plainly his attitude at that time towards the May
massacres in relation to the future of Nigeria. In his address to Alhaji Ado
Bayero, Emir of Kano, whom he had named Chancellor of the University of Nigeria
in Eastern Nigeria, he said, referring to the May riots:
“Lives and property have been lost; many have
been made homeless; others have been bereft of their loved ones; confidence has
been shaken; fear has replaced faith in one towards the other. These are sad
reflections which must remain a source of guilt and shame for all who, by
deliberate acts and insinuations were responsible, directly or indirectly, for
them. We cannot restore the lives which have been lost nor the blood which has
been shed. But we should not ignore the fact that they have been valuable lives
and blood. It must, therefore, be our prayer that the innocent blood thus shed
will be accepted as the supreme purchase price for the solid and everlasting
unity of this country, and that the
events which had led to the situation will for ever be the worst that this
country should experience.”
LISTEN TO AUDIO RECORDING: Biafra The Case For Independence Audio - Part 1
LISTEN TO AUDIO RECORDING: Biafra The Case For Independence Audio - Part 1
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